Founding Constitution

# NarcoGuard Founding Constitution **Status: FOUNDING DRAFT — NOT YET RATIFIED** **Version:** 0.2 draft **Publication date:** October 1, 2026 **Source:** The approved community governance design of September 18, 2026, revised through public draft review. This document remains a proposal: it does not itself create legal rights, an incorporated entity, or binding governance powers. Proposed commitments below are not currently enforceable. ## Preamble Save life. Connect people. Build independence. Expand possibility. Technology serves the person. The person never serves the technology. NarcoGuard should prosper when people become more capable, not when they become more dependent on NarcoGuard. ## 1. The people and their rights The people NarcoGuard serves are its permanent constitutional principal. Every person has equal worth regardless of wealth, health, recovery history, housing, contribution, or political affiliation. Assistance must never depend on joining a party, voting, donating, or surrendering protected information. Individual dignity, lawful freedom, autonomy, privacy, meaningful consent, equal treatment, due process, human review and appeal are protected against executives and majorities alike. A vulnerable person's life must never become a bargaining tool for financial, political, institutional, or technological gain. The following rights floor is proposed as non-waivable: ordinary assistance, including food, hygiene, housing navigation and emergency guidance, must never depend on participation, tracking, a risk score, or disclosure of protected data. A person may refuse or revoke location and contact sharing, pause or delete optional tracking, inspect and correct personal information, and ask for an independent human appeal. No automated score or prediction may by itself deny assistance, impose a penalty, or contact another person. A person facing an adverse decision should receive notice, access to the evidence used, a meaningful chance to respond, written reasons, and timely independent review. Retaliation for refusing tracking, raising a concern, or appealing is prohibited by this proposal. Participation never transfers ownership of an independent person's or organization's work or property to NarcoGuard. No contributor receives employment, equity, payment, production access or additional voting power merely by contributing an idea. ## 2. Person-led support and data People decide their goals, which needs to track, and whether to use guidance, location, contacts or wearable services. Consent must be understandable, specific and revocable. A refusal or pause must not remove access to ordinary assistance. People must have a practical way to inspect, correct and remove their data, subject to applicable law and narrowly necessary safety records. Consent for location, wearable data, support contacts, reminders and any future sharing must be separate, optional, purpose-specific and easy to revoke. Loved-one or other third-party alerts require explicit permission for each recipient and trigger, a preview of what will be shared, and a visible way to stop future alerts. No person should be required to disclose a recovery history to receive a community resource referral. Protected personal and health data may not be sold or exchanged for governance influence. A person is never reduced to a risk score. Predictions must disclose their evidence, uncertainty and limits; a model with inadequate evidence abstains. Clinical claims require appropriate validation. Emergency and health information must not be exposed through public governance. ## 3. Public authority and checks A future Community Assembly may deliberate and adopt ordinary policy under duly established rules. A temporary Chief Steward executes authorized policy but cannot unilaterally amend or suspend this Constitution. An independent Rights & Ethics Tribunal reviews constitutional challenges and appeals. An independent Evidence Office maintains the provenance, uncertainty and contradictions of relevant evidence without exercising governing authority. No office, funder, majority, party, AI system or faction may control all of these functions. These are proposed safeguards for any future institution, not offices that currently exist. No person may hold more than one constitutional office at a time. Any future offices should have staggered terms with short, limited service; transparent nominations; meaningful representation by affected people; and removal only for documented cause after notice, access to the evidence, a chance to respond, written reasons and independent appeal. No executive, funder or service provider may appoint or veto an independent reviewer or control the body's budget. Ordinary decisions may use majority votes. No ordinary majority may remove or narrow the rights floor. Minority objections and reasons must remain in the decision record. Decision-makers must disclose material conflicts in a public register that omits private user details, recuse from affected decisions, and use an independent replacement. A person who raises a concern or challenges a decision must be protected from retaliation. Reviewers should publish reasoned decisions and minority objections, with only the redactions needed to protect people. Selection, recusal, removal and appeal rules must be published before they are used. Money can support the mission but cannot buy sovereignty or more constitutional votes. Material conflicts of interest must be disclosed without exposing private user information. Major administrative steps should periodically justify the risks they control and be simplified or retired when no longer needed. ## 4. AI and scientific integrity AI may help people and institutions understand options, but may not vote, govern, amend this document, grant itself authority, remove human oversight or certify its own consequential actions. An AI agent may not propose, approve, deploy and audit a consequential change as one unchecked chain. Evidence informs policy; scientific facts are not created by a vote. Evidence review records contrary evidence and uncertainty. NarcoGuard remains open to the possibility that its own policies or technology are wrong and must leave people a way to challenge and correct them. ## 5. Participation and amendment The public may support or object to this draft, suggest changes, submit evidence, identify harm and raise a constitutional challenge. The first process is advisory: a submission does not edit this document or control emergency functions. Substantive proposals should receive durable identifiers, history, objections, rights analysis, conflicts, decisions and later outcome review. Sensitive challenges must have a private submission path; no one should have to publish health, location or contact details to seek review. A later ratification process must define eligibility, identity, election security, privacy, accessibility, human appeals and anti-capture controls before binding votes begin. Before ratification, proposed binding institutions and procedures require public notice and a cooling-off period, an accessible and private vote of affected people, independent rights review, published conflicts and evidence, and an auditable repository review. Any amendment affecting the rights floor requires both affected-person approval and independent rights review. A vote cannot authorize a rights violation or remove the rights floor. The exact quorum and approval threshold must be set publicly before the vote, not changed during it; dissenting views and the final version must be preserved. Details remain subject to the founding convention and lawful organizational structure. ## 6. Emergency safety and legal status No office, majority, funder, or AI may create its own emergency authority. Any future emergency action must rely on authority defined in advance, be necessary and least restrictive, narrowly scoped, recorded with written reasons, and expire automatically at a pre-set time. Emergency action may never suspend the rights floor. An independent reviewer must review the action within 72 hours, with a way for affected people to challenge it. Governance failure must not disable emergency functionality. Governance code is isolated from lifesaving paths unless a separately reviewed change explicitly requires interaction. This draft does not claim that NarcoGuard can detect, treat or prevent every overdose. This is a proposed civic and product framework, not a clinical certification, charitable trust, legal entity structure, or enforceable mission lock. Appropriate legal and clinical review is required before those claims could be made. ## Founding question If someday you—or someone you deeply loved—were vulnerable and depended on NarcoGuard, what rules would you wish we had written before NarcoGuard became powerful enough to need them?

NarcoGuard Founding Constitution

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